

OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide, Version 1


Volume 5: Critical Asset Worksheets for Information

Christopher Alberts Audrey Dorofee James Stevens Carol Woody

January 2005

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Volume 5: Critical Asset Worksheets for Information

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Networked Systems Survivability Program

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FOR THE COMMANDER

Christos Scondras Chief of Programs, XPK

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Table 1:	Worksheets Provided in This Workbook	. 1
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About This Document

This document is Volume 5 of the *OCTAVE-S Implementation Guide*, a 10-volume handbook supporting the OCTAVE-S methodology. This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as information.

The volumes in this handbook are

- Volume 1: Introduction to OCTAVE-S This volume provides a basic description of OCTAVE-S and advice on how to use the guide.
- Volume 2: Preparation Guidelines This volume contains background and guidance for preparing to conduct an OCTAVE-S evaluation.
- Volume 3: Method Guidelines This volume includes detailed guidance for each OCTAVE-S activity.
- Volume 4: Organizational Information Workbook This volume provides worksheets for all organizational-level information gathered and analyzed during OCTAVE-S.
- Volume 5: Critical Asset Workbook for Information This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as information.
- Volume 6: Critical Asset Workbook for Systems This volume provides worksheets to
 document data related to critical assets that are categorized as systems.
- Volume 7: Critical Asset Workbook for Applications This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as applications.
- Volume 8: Critical Asset Workbook for People This volume provides worksheets to document data related to critical assets that are categorized as people.
- Volume 9: Strategy and Plan Workbook This volume provides worksheets to record the current and desired protection strategy and the risk mitigation plans.
- Volume 10: Example Scenario This volume includes a detailed scenario illustrating a completed set of worksheets.

Abstract

The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation SM (OCTAVE®) approach defines a risk-based strategic assessment and planning technique for security. OCTAVE is a self-directed approach, meaning that people from an organization assume responsibility for setting the organization's security strategy. OCTAVE-S is a variation of the approach tailored to the limited means and unique constraints typically found in small organizations (less than 100 people). OCTAVE-S is led by a small, interdisciplinary team (three to five people) of an organization's personnel who gather and analyze information, producing a protection strategy and mitigation plans based on the organization's unique operational security risks. To conduct OCTAVE-S effectively, the team must have broad knowledge of the organization's business and security processes, so it will be able to conduct all activities by itself.

Introduction

1 Introduction

This document contains the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability EvaluationSM (OCTAVE®)-S worksheets related to critical assets that are information. The activities related to these worksheets are focused on analyzing a critical asset.

Table 1 provides a brief introduction to the contents of this workbook, using step numbers as a key. For more details about how to complete each step, refer to the OCTAVE®-S Method Guidelines, which can be found in Volume 3 of the OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide.

Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook

Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages
Step 6	Start a Critical Asset Information worksheet for each critical asset. Record the name of the critical asset on its Critical Asset Information worksheet.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8
Step 7	Record your rationale for selecting each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Information worksheet.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8
Step 8	Record a description for each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Selection worksheet. Consider who uses each critical asset as well as who is responsible for it.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8
Step 9	Record assets that are related to each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Information worksheet. Refer to the Asset Identification worksheet to determine which assets are related to each critical asset.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8

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Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook (cont.)

Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages
Step 10	Record the security requirements for each critical asset on that asset's Critical Asset Information worksheet.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8
Step 11	For each critical asset, record the most important security requirement on that asset's Critical Asset Information worksheet.	Critical Asset Information	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Select Critical Assets	5-8
Step 12	Complete all appropriate threat trees for each critical asset. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset. If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on any threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the <i>Threat Translation Guide</i> .	Risk Profile Threat Translation Guide	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	9-54
Step 13	Record specific examples of threat actors on the Risk Profile worksheet for each applicable actor-motive combination.	Risk Profile	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	9-54
Step 14	Record the strength of the motive for deliberate threats due to human actors. Also record how confident you are in your estimate of the strength of the actor's motive.	Risk Profile	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	9-54
Step 15	Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.	Risk Profile	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	9-54
Step 16	Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.	Risk Profile	Phase 1 Process S2 S2.1 Identify Threats to Critical Assets	9-54

Introduction

Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook (cont.)


Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages
Step 17	Select the system of interest for each critical asset (i.e., the system most closely related to the critical asset).	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18a	Review paths used to access each critical asset, and select key classes of components related to each critical asset. Determine which classes of components are part of the system of interest.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18b	Determine which classes of components serve as intermediate access points (i.e., which components are used to transmit information and applications from the system of interest to people).	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18c	Determine which classes of components, both internal and external to the organization's networks, are used by people (e.g., users, attackers) to access the system.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18d	Determine where information from the system of interest is stored for backup purposes.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58
Step 18e	Determine which other systems access information or applications from the system of interest and which other classes of components can be used to access critical information or services from the system of interest.	Network Access Paths	Phase 2 Process S3 S3.1 Examine Access Paths	55-58

Introduction OCTAVE-S V1.0

Table 1: Worksheets Provided in This Workbook (cont.)

Step	Description	Worksheet	Activity	Pages
criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or		Risk Profile Impact Evaluation Criteria	Phase 3 Process S4 S4.1 Evaluate Impacts of Threats	9-54
Step 24	Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) for each active threat to each critical asset. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.	Risk Profile Probability Evaluation Criteria	Phase 3 Process S4 S4.3 Evaluate Probabilities of Threats	9-54
Step 26	Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of each critical asset's Risk Profile worksheet.	Risk Profile Security Practices	Phase 3 Process S5 S5.2 Select Mitigation Approaches	9-54
Step 27 Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk. For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.		Risk Profile	Phase 3 Process S5 S5.2 Select Mitigation Approaches	9-54

2 Critical Asset Information Worksheet for Information



Critical Asset Information worksheet.

Step 6	Step 7
Critical Asset	Rationale for Selection
What is the critical information?	Why is this information critical to the organization?
	,
Step 9	
Related Assets	
Which assets are related to this in	formation?
which assets are retated to this in	gormation:
Systems:	Applications:
Systems.	
	•
Other:	
Other:	

Step 8			
Description			
Who uses the information	on? Who is re.	spons	ible for the information?
Step 10			p 11
Security Requirement	S	Most Important Security Requirement	
What are the security re	equirements for this information?	Which security requirement	
Hint: Focus on what th	he security requirements should be for this information, not what they currently are.)	info	nost important for this ormation?
☐ Confidentiality	Only authorized personnel can view		Confidentiality
	<u></u>		
			Integrity
Integrity	Only authorized personnel can modify	0	Availability
			Other
			•
☐ Availability	must be available for personnel to perform their jobs.	1	

Unavailability cannot exceed _____ hour(s) per every _____ hours.

☐ Other

3 Risk Profile Worksheet for Information – Human Actors Using Network Access

Process S2
Activity S2.3
branch of each
ription and
s workbook).

Phase 1

Complete the threat tree for human actors using network access. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.

If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the Threat Translation Guide (see pp. 60-63 of this workbook).

Step 13 Record specific examples of threat actors on the Risk Profile worksheet for each applicable actor-motive combination.

Step 14 Record the strength of the motive for deliberate threats due to human actors. Also record how confident you are in your estimate of the strength of the actor's motive.

Step 15 Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.

Step 16 Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Phase 3 — Process S4 Activity S4.1

Step 22

Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3 Process S4
Activity S4.3

Step 24

Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3
Process S5
Activity S5.2

Step 26

Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.


Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

Human Acto	ors Using l	Network A	Access					Basic	Risk	Profile
Step 12					Step 2	22				
the asset? M	lark these bro f the remaini	anches on the ng branches	gligible possibil e tree.	lity of a threat to gible possibility or ese branches.	What i	is the p	otential	Values impaci applica	on the	ea?
Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome				-		
					Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
				disclosure						
			accidental	modification						
				loss, destruction						
		inside		interruption						
			deliberate	disclosure modification						
	network	-		loss, destruction						
				interruption				<u> </u>		<u> </u>
			accidental	disclosure modification				L		
				loss, destruction						
		outside	-	interruption						
				disclosure			L	<u> </u>		
			deliberate	modification						
				loss, destruction						
				interruption						

Basic R	isk Profile		Human Actors Using N	Network Access
Step 24		Step 26		Step 27
How likel occur in t	obability y is the threat to he future? How are you in your	Sect What is the stoplight status for	each security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value	Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
	Very Somewhat Not At All	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	Accept Defer Mitigate
	>	1. 4. 6. 4. 6. 6	8 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
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				0 0 0
			公路 66	
			長金蘭	0 0 0
				000
			秦中	
			沙藻	
			4- 414-	000
			例據6	
				0 0 0
				0 0 0



Threat Context	Human Actors Usin	g Network Access
Step 14	Step 15	
Motive	History	
How strong is the actor's are you in thi motive? estimate?		How accurate are the data?
High Medium Low Very Somewhat	Not At All	Very Somewhat Not At All
	times in years	
	times in years	
4.40963	times in years	
See 175 See 18 S	times in years	
	times in years	
克勒斯	times in years	
STATE TO SERVE A	times in years	
AND WASHINGTON	times in years	

Step 16 **Areas of Concern Human Actors Using Network Access Insiders Using Network Access** Give examples of how insiders acting accidentally could use network access to threaten this information. Give examples of how insiders acting deliberately could use network access to threaten this information. **Outsiders Using Network Access** Give examples of how outsiders acting accidentally could use network access to threaten this information. Give examples of how outsiders acting deliberately could use network access to threaten this information.

Areas of Concern	
	Insiders Using Network Access
	·
	,
	Outsiders Using Network Access
	The second secon
•	
	·
	<u>.</u>
	·
	·

4 Risk Profile Worksheet for Information – Human Actors Using Physical Access

Phase 1 Process S2
Activity S2.3

	Activity S2.3
Step 12	Complete the threat tree for human actors using physical access. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.
,	If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the <i>Threat Translation Guide</i> (see pp. 64-67 of this workbook).
Step 13	Record specific examples of threat actors on the <i>Risk Profile worksheet</i> for each applicable actor-motive combination.
Step 14	Record the strength of the motive for deliberate threats due to human actors. Also record how confident you are in your estimate of the strength of the actor's motive.
Step 15	Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.
Step 16	Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.1

Step 22

Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3 Process S4 Activity S4.3

Step 24

Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3
Process S5
Activity S5.2

Step 26

Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.


Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

Human Actors Using Physical A	ccess					Basic	Risk	Profile
Step 12			Step 2	22				
Three For which branches is there a non-ne, the asset? Mark these branches on the For which of the remaining branches no possibility of a threat to the asset?	rible possibility or	Impact Values What is the potential impact on the organization in each applicable area?			a?			
Asset Access Actor	Motive	Outcome	,					
								1 1 1
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
		disclosure						
	accidental	modification						
		loss, destruction						
inside		interruption						
	deliberate	disclosure modification						
physical		loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure					<u> </u>	
	accidental	modification						
		loss, destruction						
outside	-	interruption						
		disclosure						
	deliberate	modification						
		loss, destruction						
		interruption			Ĺ			

Basic R	isk Profile		Human Actors Using	Physical Access
Step 24		Step 26		Step 27
Probability How likely is the threat to occur in the future? How confident are you in your estimate?		Secu What is the stoplight status for e	rity Practice Areas each security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value	Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
	Very Somewhat Not At All	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	Accept Defer Mitigate
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			2000年 4000年 1000年	000
			The local of the section of the sect	
			Mada Maria	



Threat Context		Human Actors Using Physical Access				
Step 14 Step 15						
Moti	ve	History				
How strong is the actor's motive?	How confident are you in this estimate?	How often has this threat occurred in the past?	How accurate are the data?			
High Medium Low	Very Somewhat Not At All		Very Somewhat Not At All			
A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH	《杨阳	times in years	0 0 0			
A STATE OF THE STA		times in years				
Bridge Brown	(4)	times in years				
See all the first		times in years				
		times in years times in years times in years times in years				
Something States	All the said	times in years				
State of the second	प्रमुख्यात् पुरस्त <u>ित्</u>	times in years				
AND STATE OF THE STATE OF	Both Marine Contract	times in years	0 0 0			
18 1 Aug 2	The stage of the s	times in years				
		times inyearstimes inyearstimes inyearstimes inyears				

Step 16 **Areas of Concern Human Actors Using Physical Access Insiders Using Physical Access** Give examples of how insiders acting accidentally could use physical access to threaten this information. Give examples of how insiders acting deliberately could use physical access to threaten this information. **Outsiders Using Physical Access** Give examples of how outsiders acting accidentally could use physical access to threaten this information. Give examples of how outsiders acting deliberately could use physical access to threaten this information.

Areas of Concern	
	Insiders Using Physical Access
	Outsiders Using Physical Access
	,
e e	
,	

5 Risk Profile Worksheet for Information – System Problems

Phase 1 F Process S2 Activity S2.3

Step 12 Complete the threat tree for system problems. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.

If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and

If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the *Threat Translation Guide* (see pp. 68-71 of this workbook).

- Step 15 Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.
- Step 16 Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.1

Step 22

Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.3

Step 24

Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3 Process S5 Activity S5.2

Step 26

Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.

Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

System Problems Basic Risk Pro					Profile			
Step 12			Step 2	2				
	Threat				-	Values		1
the asset? Mark these b			What i	is the po ization	otential in each	impact applica	on the able are	a?
For which of the remai no possibility of a three	ning branches is there a negli at to the asset? Do not mark th	gible possibility or nese branches.						
Asset	Actor	Outcome						
9			u		vity			
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
·		disclosure						
	software defects	modification						
		loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	system crashes	modification						
		loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	hardware defects	modification						
		loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	malicious code	modification						
	(virus, worm, Trojan horse, back door)	loss, destruction						
		interruption						
i								

Basic Ri	sk Profile		System Problems
Step 24		Step 26	Step 27
How likely occur in th	bability is the threat to e future? How ire you in your	Security Practice Areas What is the stoplight status for each security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value	Confidence	Strategic Operational	
	Very Somewhat Not At All	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning 7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des	15. Incident Mgmt Accept Defer Mitigate
	>	1 2 6 4 6 9 7 8 9 1	000
			000
	₋		
			000
		(A.25)	000
			000
			000
			000
			000

System Problems				Threat Context
			Step 15	
			History	
			How often has this threat occurred in the past?	How accurate are the data?
·				Very Somewhat Not At All
		disclosure	times in years	
softwar	e defects	modification	times in years	
		loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
	:	disclosure	times in years	
system	crashes	modification	times in years	
		loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
	:	disclosure	times in years	
hardwa	re defects	modification	times in years	
		loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
	i	disclosure	times in years	
malicio		modification	times in years	
(virus, v horse, b	worm, Trojan ack door)	loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	
'				

reat Context	System Problems
Notes	
What additional notes about each threa	nt do you want to record?
	·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
L	

Step 16 **Areas of Concern System Problems Software Defects** Give examples of how software defects could threaten this information. **System Crashes** Give examples of how system crashes could threaten this information. **Hardware Defects** Give examples of how hardware defects could threaten this information. **Malicious Code** Give examples of how malicious code could threaten this information. (Consider viruses, worms, Trojan horses, back doors, others)

Areas of Concern	
	Software Defects
	Software Defects
·	
	System Crashes
	,
	Hardware Defects
	ļ
	Malicious Code
	Wancious Code
	·

6 Risk Profile Worksheet for Information – Other Problems

Phase I grand Process S2 Activity S2.3

Step 12

Complete the threat tree for *other problems*. Mark each branch of each tree for which there is a non-negligible possibility of a threat to the asset.

If you have difficulty interpreting a threat on the threat tree, review the description and examples of that threat in the *Threat Translation Guide* (see pp. 72-77 of this workbook).

Step 15

Record how often each threat has occurred in the past. Also record how accurate you believe your data are.

Step 16

Record areas of concern for each source of threat where appropriate. An area of concern is a scenario defining how specific threats could affect the critical asset.

continued

Phase 3
Process S4
Activity S4.1

Step 22

Using the impact evaluation criteria as a guide, assign an impact value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat.

Phase 3 Process S4
Activity S4.3

Step 24

Using the probability evaluation criteria as a guide, assign a probability value (high, medium, or low) to each active threat. Document your confidence level in your probability estimate.

Phase 3
Process S5
Activity S5.2

Step 26

Transfer the stoplight status for each security practice area from the Security Practices worksheet to the "Security Practice Areas" section (Step 26) of the following worksheet.

Step 27

Select a mitigation approach (mitigate, defer, accept) for each active risk.

For each risk that you decided to mitigate, circle one or more security practice areas for which you intend to implement mitigation activities.

Other Problems Basic F					Risk	Profile		
Step 12			Step 2	2				
	Threat	n, of a threat to	Impact Values What is the potential impact on the					
the asset? Mark these brai			organi	ization	in each	applica	ible are	a?
For which of the remaining no possibility of a threat to	g branches is there a negligi the asset? Do not mark the	ible possibility or se branches.						
Asset	Actor	Outcome						
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other
		disclosure						
	power supply	modification						
	problems	loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	telecommunications	modification						
	problems or unavailability	loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	third-party problems	modification						
	or unavailability of third-party systems	loss, destruction						
		interruption						
		disclosure						
	natural disasters	modification						
	(e.g., flood, fire, tornado)	loss, destruction						
		interruption						

Basic R	isk Profile		C	ther Problems
Step 24		Step 26		Step 27
How likel	obability y is the threat to he future? How are you in your	Secur What is the stoplight status for ea	rity Practice Areas ach security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value	Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
	Somewhat Not At All	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	Accept Defer Defer
				0 0 0

Other Problems				Thre	at C	ontext
·		Step 15				
			History			
		How often has this the occurred in the past	hreat ?		accur ne data	
				Very	Somewhat	Not At All
	disclosure	times in	years			
power sup	pply modification	times in	years			
problems	loss, destructi	on times in	years			
	interruption	times in	years			
	disclosure	times in	years			
telecomm	nunications modification	times in	years			
problems unavailab		on times in	years			
unavanab	interruption	times in	years			
	disclosure	times in	years			
third-part	y problems modification	times in	years		1	
or unavai	lability of loss destruction	ontimes in	years			
tnird-part	y systems interruption	times in	years			
	disclosure	times in	years	0		
natural di	isasters modification	times in	years		<u> </u>	
(e.g., floo tornado)		on times in	years		0	
(Sinado)	interruption	times in	years	0		

eat Context	Other Probl
Notes	
What additional notes about each th	reat do you want to record?
•	

Step 16 **Areas of Concern Other Problems Power Supply Problems** Give examples of how power supply problems could threaten this information. **Telecommunications Problems** Give examples of how telecommunications problems could threaten this information. **Third-Party Problems** Give examples of how thirdparty problems could threaten this information. **Natural Disasters** Give examples of how natural disasters could threaten this information.

reas of Concern	
	Power Supply Problems
•	Telecommunications Problems
	Third-Party Problems
	Natural Disasters
	THE COLUMN DESCRIPTION OF THE COLUMN DESCRIP

Other Problems (cont.)					Basic	Risk	Profile		
Step 12			Step 2	2					
	Threat		Impact Values						
the asset? Mark these bran			What is the potential impact on the organization in each applicable area?					a?	
For which of the remaining no possibility of a threat to	ible possibility or ese branches.								
Asset	Actor	Outcome							
			Reputation	Financial	Productivity	Fines	Safety	Other	
		disclosure							
	physical configuration	modification							
	or arrangement of buildings, offices, or	loss, destruction							
	equipment								
· .		disclosure							
		modification							
		loss, destruction							
	,	interruption							
		disclosure							
		modification							
		loss, destruction							
		interruption						•	
		disclosure							
·		modification							
	7	loss, destruction							
		interruption							

Basic R	isk Profile		Other P	roblems (cont.)
Probability How likely is the threat to occur in the future? How confident are you in your estimate?		Step 26		Step 27
		Secur What is the stoplight status for ea	rity Practice Areas ach security practice area?	Approach What is your approach for addressing each risk?
Value	Confidence	Strategic	Operational	
	Very Somewhat Not At All	1. Sec Training 2. Sec Strategy 3. Sec Mgmt 4. Sec Policy & Reg 5. Coll Sec Mgmt 6. Cont Planning	7. Phys Acc Cntrl 8. Monitor Phys Sec 9. Sys & Net Mgmt 10. Monitor IT Sec 11. Authen & Auth 12. Vul Mgmt 13. Encryption 14. Sec Arch & Des 15. Incident Mgmt	Accept Defer Mitigate
				000
				0 0 0
				000
				000
				000
				0 0 0
				000
				000
				000
				0 0 0
				000

Other Problem	ns (cont.)			Threat Context
		S	tep 15	
			History	
			How often has this threat occurred in the past?	How accurate are the data?
				Very Somewhat Not At All
		disclosure	times in years	
	physical configuration	modification	times in years	
	or arrangement of buildings, offices, or	loss, destruction	times in years	
	equipment	interruption	times in years	
		disclosure modification	times in years	
		loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	0 0 0
		disclosure	times in years	
		loss, destruction	times in years	
		interruption	times in years	0 0 0
		disclosure modification	times in years times in years	0 0 0
	L	loss, destruction	times in years	0 0 0
		interruption	times in years	

nreat Context	Other Problems (cont.
Notes	
What additional notes about each threa	at do you want to record?
,	
ts	
F	
,	

Step 16 **Areas of Concern** Other Problems (cont.) **Physical Configuration Problems** Give examples of how physical configuration of buildings, offices, or equipment could threaten this information. Give examples of how could threaten this information. Give examples of how could threaten this information. Give examples of how could threaten this information.

Areas of Concern	
	Physical Configuration Problems
	·
	·
1 1 1	
1	

7 Network Access Paths Worksheet

	Phase 2 Process S3 Activity S3.1
Step 17	Select the system of interest for each critical asset (i.e., the system most closely related to the critical asset).
Step 18a	Review paths used to access each critical asset, and select key classes of components related to each critical asset. Determine which classes of components are part of the system of interest.
Step 18b	Determine which classes of components serve as intermediate access points (i.e., which components are used to transmit information and applications from the system of interest to people).
Step 18c	Determine which classes of components, both internal and external to the organization's networks, are used by people (e.g., users, attackers) to access the system.
Step 18d	Determine where information from the system of interest is stored for backup purposes.
Step 18e	Determine which other systems access information or applications from the system of interest and which other classes of components can be used to access critical information or services from the system of interest.

Step 17 **System of Interest** What system or systems are most closely related to the critical asset? **Access Points** Intermediate System of **Access Points** Interest Step 18b Step 18a **Intermediate Access Points System of Interest** Which of the following classes of Which of the following classes of components are used to transmit components are part of the system information and applications from of interest? the system of interest to people? Which classes of components could serve as intermediate access points? ■ Internal Networks Servers ■ External Networks ☐ Internal Networks On-Site Workstations Others (list) ☐ Others (list)

Note: When you select a key class of components, make sure that you also document any relevant subclasses or specific examples when appropriate.

	Access Points	
System Access by People	Data Storage Locations	Other Systems/ Components
Step 18c	Step 18d	Step 18e
System Access by People	Data Storage Locations	Other Systems and Components
From which of the following classes of components can people (e.g., users, attackers) access the system of interest? Consider access points both internal and external to your organization's networks.	On which classes of components is information from the system of interest stored for backup purposes?	Which other systems access information or applications from the system of interest? Which other classes of components can be used to access critical information or applications from the system of interest?
☐ On-Site Workstations	☐ Storage Devices	<u> </u>
☐ Laptops	Others (list)	·
□ PDAs/Wireless Components		<u> </u>
☐ Home/External Workstations		
Others (list)	•	

8 Threat Translation Guide

Phase 1 Process S2 Activity S2.3

Threat Translation Guide

The *Threat Translation Guide* describes each branch of an asset-based threat tree. If you have difficulty understanding the types of threats represented by a branch, you can use this guide to decipher the meaning of that branch.

You will find asset-based threat trees for the following sources of threat:

Source of Threat	Page	
Human actors using network access	60-63	
Human actors using physical access	64-67	
System problems	68-71	
Other problems	72-77	

60

Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
			•	disclosure
			accidental	modification
				loss, destruction
		inside		interruption
				disclosure
			deliberate	modification
	network			loss, destruction
				interruption

Description	Example
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally views confidential information on an important system.	Incorrect file permissions enable a staff member to accidentally access a restricted personnel database.
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally modifies information on an important system.	A staff member accidentally enters incorrect financial data into a customer database.
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally loses or destroys information on an important system.	A staff member deletes an important customer file by mistake.
A staff member without malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure accidentally interrupts access to an important system.	A staff member who is not computer savvy inadvertently crashes an important system.
·	
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to deliberately view confidential information on an important system.	A staff member uses access to a restricted personnel database to deliberately view information in that database that is restricted by policy.
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to deliberately modify information on an important system.	A staff member responsible for data entry deliberately enters incorrect customer information into a database.
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to deliberately lose or destroy information on an important system.	A staff member with access to design documents for a new product deliberately deletes the files that contain those design documents.
A staff member with malicious intent who has legitimate access to the computing infrastructure exploits that access to deliberately interrupt access to an important system.	A staff member uses legitimate access to the computing infrastructure to launch a denial-of-service attack on an important system.

Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
-				
	network	,		
			÷	disclosure
			accidental	modification
				loss, destruction
		outside		interruption
				disclosure
		•	deliberate	modification
				loss, destruction
			•	interruption


Description	Example
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and views confidential data on a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally views confidential personnel data.
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and accidentally modifies information on a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally modifies important customer data.
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and loses or destroys information on a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally loses or destroys financial data.
An outsider without malicious intent gains access to your computing infrastructure (legitimately or by accident) and accidentally interrupts access to a system.	Temporary employees are given access to your computing infrastructure to help with an increased workload. While performing their job duties, one of them accidentally crashe an important system.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to view confidential information.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to a key business system. The spy uses that access to view confidential customer information on the system.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to modify information.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to a key business system. The spy uses that access to modify financial data on the system.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to lose or destroy information.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to a key business system. The spy uses that access to lose or destroy a new product design on the system.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to interrupt access to a system.	A corporate spy exploits vulnerabilities in the computing infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to an airline's scheduling system. The spy uses that access to crash the system and prevent real-time updates.

Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
				disclosure
			accidental	modification
				loss, destruction
		inside		interruption
				disclosure
			deliberate	modification
	physical			loss, destruction
				interruption

Example Description A staff member accidentally sees confidential information A staff member without malicious intent accidentally views on (1) a colleague's computer screen or (2) a printout on a confidential information after gaining physical access to a system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the colleague's desk. information. A staff member modifies information by (1) accidentally A staff member without malicious intent accidentally altering information on a colleague's computer while using modifies information after gaining physical access to a it for another purpose or (2) accidentally taking a page of a system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the printout on a colleague's desk. information. A staff member loses or destroys information by (1) A staff member without malicious intent accidentally loses accidentally deleting information from a colleague's or destroys information after gaining physical access to a computer while using it or (2) shredding a paper system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the accidentally taken from a colleague's desk. information. A staff member interrupts access to a system by (1) A staff member without malicious intent interrupts access to accidentally crashing the system while accessing it from a a system or information by accidentally using physical colleague's computer or (2) locking the keys inside an office access to a system, one of its components, or a physical where a physical file is stored. copy of the information to prevent others from accessing the system or information. A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically A staff member with malicious intent deliberately views restricted area of the building to deliberately (1) view confidential information by breeching physical security and confidential information on a computer or (2) read a accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a confidential memo lying on a desk. physical copy of the information. A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically A staff member with malicious intent deliberately modifies restricted area of the building to deliberately (1) modify information by breeching physical security and accessing information on a computer or (2) modify a physical file components of the computing infrastructure or a physical lying on a desk. copy of the information. A staff member with malicious intent deliberately loses or A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically destroys information by breeching physical security and restricted area of the building to deliberately (1) delete information on a computer or (2) destroy a physical file accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a physical copy of the information. lying on a desk. A staff member uses unauthorized access to a physically A staff member with malicious intent deliberately interrupts restricted area of the building to (1) gain access to and then access to an important system or information by breeching deliberately crash an important business system or (2) jam physical security to a system, one of its components, or a the door and prevent others from physically accessing the physical copy of the information and using that physical systems and information located in that area of the building. access to prevent others from accessing the system or information.


luman Actors	Using Physica	l Access		
Asset	Access	Actor	Motive	Outcome
			•	
	physical	}		
				disclosure
			accidental	modification
			,	loss, destruction
		outside		interruption
				disclosure
			deliberate	modification
				loss, destruction
	•			
				interruption

Description	Example
An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of information and uses that access to view confidential information accidentally.	A consultant is given access to a staff member's office and accidentally sees confidential information on (1) a staff member's computer screen or (2) a printout on a staff member's desk.
An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of information and uses that access to modify information accidentally.	A consultant is given access to the computer room and (1) accidentally makes the wrong change to a configuration file on a server or (2) accidentally records the wrong information in a maintenance log.
An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of information and uses that access to lose or destroy information accidentally.	A consultant configuring one of your servers is given access to the computer room and accidentally (1) destroys an important electronic file or (2) throws away an important piece of system documentation.
An outsider without malicious intent gains physical access to your computing infrastructure or a physical copy of information and uses that access to accidentally prevent others from accessing the information.	A consultant configuring one of your servers is given acces to the computer room and accidentally (1) crashes a system while accessing it or (2) locks the keys to the computer room inside it after he or she leaves.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately views confidential information by breeching physical security and accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a physical copy of the information.	A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and view confidential information either (1) on a key business system or (2) in a physical file.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately modifies information by breeching physical security and accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a physical copy of the information.	A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and modify financial information either (1) on a key business system or (2) in a physical file.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately loses or destroys information by breeching physical security and accessing components of the computing infrastructure or a physical copy of the information.	A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and destroy customer information either (1) on a key business system or (2) in a physical file.
An attacker with malicious intent deliberately interrupts access to an important system or information by breeching physical security to a system, one of its components, or a physical copy of the information and by using that physical access to prevent others from accessing the system or information.	A corporate spy poses as a member of the cleaning crew to gain unauthorized physical access to a competitor's site and (1) deliberately crashes an important business system or (2) jams the door to prevent others from physically accessing the systems and information located in an area of the building.



^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
A software defect results in disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	A defect in a computer's operating system changes file access permissions to permit world read and write permissions on certain files and directories.
A software defect results in modification of information on a system.	A custom software application incorrectly performs mathematical operations on data, affecting the integrity of the results.
A software defect results in the loss or destruction of information on a system.	A word processing application is known to crash computers periodically because of a problem with a specific command sequence, destroying any information that was not saved.
A software defect results in a system crash, preventing access to the system.	A word processing application is known to crash computers periodically because of a problem with a specific command sequence, preventing access to that computer.
A system crashes for unknown reasons (i.e., it cannot be traced to a software defect, hardware defect, malicious code, or actions by people), resulting in disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
A system crashes for unknown reasons (i.e., it cannot be traced to a software defect, hardware defect, malicious code, or actions by people), resulting in modification of information on that system.	A system crashes during a lengthy update of a financial database, corrupting the information in the database.
A system crashes for unknown reasons (i.e., it cannot be traced to a software defect, hardware defect, malicious code, or actions by people), resulting in the loss or destruction of information on that system.	A customer database system frequently crashes, destroying any information that was not saved at the time of the crash.
	An email server crashes, resulting in interruption of user




^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
A hardware defect results in disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
A hardware defect results in modification of information on a system.	A disk drive develops a hardware problem that affects the integrity of a database that is stored on the disk.
A hardware defect results in the loss or destruction of information on a system.	A disk drive develops a hardware problem that ends up destroying the information on the disk. Files can be retrieved only from backups.
A hardware defect results in a system crash, preventing access to the system.	A disk drive develops a hardware problem, preventing access to any information on the disk until the problem is corrected.
A system is affected by malicious code (virus, worm, Trojan horse, back door) that enables unauthorized parties to view information.	A back door on a system enables unauthorized people to access the system and view customer credit card information on that system.
A system is affected by malicious code (virus, worm, Trojan horse, back door) that modifies information on that system.	A system is infected with a virus that modifies a process control application on the computer's disk drive.
A system is affected by malicious code (virus, worm, Trojan horse, back door) that deletes information on that system.	A system is infected with a virus that deletes all information on the computer's disk drive.
A system is affected by malicious code (virus, worm, Trojan horse, back door) that results in the system crashing.	A system is infected with a virus that is spread via email, slowing network traffic and creating a denial-of-services attack.

ther Problems		
Asset	Actor	Outcome
		disclosure
	power supply	modification
	problems	
		loss, destruction
		interruption
		1
		disclosure
	telecommunications	modification
	problems or unavailability	
	unavanaomy	loss, destruction
-		
		interruption
		12

^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
Problems with the power supply lead to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
Problems with the power supply lead to modification of information on a system.	
Problems with the power supply lead to loss or destruction of information on a system.	A power outage results in loss of any information that was not saved at the time of the outage.
Problems with the power supply lead to interruption of	A power outage prevents access to all key business systems.
access to a system.	•
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to	
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	
disclosure of information to unauthorized parties. Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to	
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to modification of information on a system.	
disclosure of information to unauthorized parties. Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to	
Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to modification of information on a system. Unavailability of telecommunications services leads to loss	



^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	A staff member from a third-party service provider views confidential information on a key business system that is maintained by that service provider.
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to modification of information on a system.	Problems at a third-party service provider lead to the modification of information on a key business system located at that provider's site and maintained by the provider.
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to loss or destruction of information on a system.	Problems at a third-party service provider lead to the destruction of information on a key business system located at that provider's site and maintained by the provider.
Problems with services provided by third parties (e.g., maintenance of systems) lead to interruption of access to a system.	A system maintained by a third-party service provider and located at the provider's site is unavailable due to problems created by that provider's staff.
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	People at the site of a tornado see confidential memos that are dispersed among the debris.
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to modification of information.	
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to loss or destruction of information.	The flooding of a basement area destroys paper records that are stored there.
Natural disasters (e.g., flood, fire, tornado) lead to interruption of access to a system.	The flooding of a computer room in the basement of a building prevents access to systems in that room.

Actor	Outcome
	disclosure
physical configuration	modification
or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment	
Cympinent	loss, destruction
	interruption
	diadaana
	disclosure
	modification
	loss, destruction
	interruption
	physical configuration

^{*} Blank lines indicate unusual or extremely rare possibilities.

Description	Example*
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to disclosure of information to unauthorized parties.	The layout of an office workspace enables anyone in the area to view customer credit card information displayed on computer screens.
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to modification of information on a system.	
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to loss or destruction of information on a system.	
The physical configuration or arrangement of buildings, offices, or equipment leads to interruption of access to a system.	

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